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R157pulvinar, PIm, that is interconnected
with MT is likely unique to primates.
Thus, area MT and PIm may have
evolved in concert. Possibly the
caudomedial portion of the inferior
pulvinar was dominated throughout
by superior colliculus inputs in the
ancestors of primates, and the PIm
territory was first isolated from the rest
of PI by an expanded input from the
retina, replacing, in part, the role of the
superior colliculus in activating a part of
temporal visual cortex, the antecedent
of MT. As a later step in this proposed
evolution, V1 projections to MT
emerged slightly later in development,
reducing or eliminating the role of the
retinal inputs to PIm in vision, with PIm
eventually becoming a satellite nucleus
of MT, receiving its major input from
MT while projecting back to MT. Thus,
the results of Warner et al. [9] provide
insights into the ways in which area
MT and surrounding cortex might have
evolved in the immediate ancestors of
primates.
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of Sight and Sound outside of
Awareness?A recent study found that auditory and visual information can be integrated
even when you are completely unaware of hearing or seeing the paired
stimuli — but only if you have received prior, conscious exposure to the paired
stimuli.Jean-Paul Noel, Mark Wallace,
and Randolph Blake
Many of the objects and events we
encounter during our everyday lives are
made up of distinct blends of auditory
and visual information: dogs barking,
motors whining, people talking. Even
though the physical signals conveying
those qualities are fundamentally
different — for example, photic energy
versus acoustic energy — our brain
seamlessly integrates, or ‘binds’, thisinformation into a coherent perceptual
Gestalt. The unitary nature of these
multisensory perceptual experiences
raises an important question in the
context of prevailing theories of
consciousness [1]: specifically, can
such binding take place prior to the
emergence of consciousness, or is it an
emergent property of consciousness?
Earlier work has indicated that audible
sounds can impact invisible pictures
suppressed from awareness during
binocular rivalry [2], but can auditoryand visual signals interact when both
are presented outside of awareness? A
recent study by Faivre et al. [3] provides
an answer to this question by
unequivocally demonstrating the
interaction of subthreshold auditory
and visual cues. Left unanswered,
however, is whether this interaction
represents genuine multisensory
integration or, instead, arises from
interactions at amodal, semantic levels
of analysis (Figure 1).
In the new study [3], participants
were briefly presented a priming
stimulus made up of a pair of
digits — one presented as a visual
stimulus and the other as an auditory
stimulus — that were sometimes
identical (for example, a spoken ‘2’ and
a printed ‘2’) and other times were not
(for example, a spoken ‘8’ and a printed
‘2’). This prime was then followed
by an audio-visual pair of target letters
that were either identical or not.
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Figure 1. Schematic representations of alternative ways in which auditory and visual informa-
tion may interact in the priming design of Faivre et al. [3].
(A) Multisensory integration involves combination of sensory signals from visual cortex
(denoted by red) and auditory cortex (denoted by green), resulting in an integrated represen-
tation in regions of multisensory cortex (for example, superior temporal and/or parietal
regions, denoted by yellow). (B) With semantic comparison, two independent sensory repre-
sentations, one auditory (green) and the other visual (red), signify the same object and,
thus, activate a common semantic concept (the abstract concept of the number, represented
by ‘two’, in this case) within higher level, cognitive areas.
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R158second pair was the same (for example,
a spoken and printed ‘b’) or different
(for example, a spoken ‘m’ and a
printed ‘b’). Crucially, the first
audio-visual digit pair — the priming
pair — was presented at subthreshold
intensities and durations. This clever
design meant that the pair of primes
and the pair of targets could either be
congruent (both pairs the ‘same’ or
both pairs ‘different’) or incongruent
(one pair the ‘same’ and the other pair
‘different’). With this design, by
contrasting reaction times to
target-relationship identification as a
function of whether or not that pair was
congruent with the prime-relationship,
the authors were able to determine
whether the subthreshold primes were
integrated (as evidenced by reduced
reaction times). Indeed, a congruency
effect would be dependent on
the successful determination of the
semantic relationship between the
subliminal auditory and visual digits.
The authors also assessed priming
under conditions where the auditory
and visual digits were suprathreshold.
Remarkably, following repeated
exposures to primes presented at
suprathreshold levels, subliminal pairs
were able to impact reaction times for
judging the auditory-visual target
relationship, an outcome implying that
these subliminal auditory and visual
signals were integrated outside of
awareness. But what is being
integrated in such a situation? Is it the
low-level visual and acoustic features
of the priming stimuli (thus arguing fortrue multisensory integration)? Or is it
the higher-order semantic features of
the stimuli, thus arguing for a process
based on comparison of congruence
of semantic information arising from
two sources, rather than on genuine
integration?
The results from the Faivre et al. [3]
study do not allow us unequivocally
to answer this question. They do,
however, provide important clues
suggesting that the process may be
taking place at the semantic level.
These clues are founded in one of the
hallmark features of multisensory
integration — the concept of inverse
effectiveness — whereby the
multisensory gain is most pronounced
when the paired unisensory signals are
weak [4,5]. If the priming signals were
being integrated in a multisensory
manner, one would expect that the
weaker the primes, the greater the gain
when they were integrated, and thus,
the larger the effects sizes. Conversely,
if the results were entirely driven by
sensory-independent semantic
congruency priming, we would expect
that the stronger the priming signal,
the bigger the effect size.
Although inverse effectiveness was
not directly tested, there are several
informative aspects of the
experimental results that bear on the
interpretation. The first emerges from a
comparison of the results of
experiments 1 and 2 with those of
experiment 3. In the first two
experiments the auditory (experiment
1) and visual (experiment 2) primeswere presented at levels sufficiently
strong to render them unequivocally
suprathreshold, while in experiment 3
they were both presented subliminally.
Despite these differences in stimulus
effectiveness, the priming effects were
comparable in magnitude for each of
these three experiments. The second
clue emerges from the comparison of
results from the first three experiments,
where participants were exposed to
suprathreshold primes before
subliminal testing, to the results from
experiment 4, where subliminal testing
was not preceded by exposure to
suprathreshold prime pairs. Subliminal
priming worked in experiments 1–3 but
did not work in experiment 4. Framed in
the context of inverse effectiveness, it
is not at all obvious why prior exposure
would be necessary before weak
stimuli could be integrated in order to
facilitate performance. Thus, this
pattern of results also seems
incompatible with the concept of
inverse effectiveness, but compatible
with semantic priming.
We believe that, in addition to
effectiveness manipulations, another
key set of principles governing
multisensory integration may be used
in future work to further differentiate
between unconscious multisensory
integration and unconscious semantic
comparison. It is well established that
the spatial and temporal structure of
paired sensory cues — here, the
spoken andwritten digits—are amajor
determinant of the probability that
these cues will be integrated. Stimuli
in close spatial and temporal
correspondence have a high likelihood
of being integrated [6]. In contrast,
semantic priming should be
independent of the spatial location at
which stimuli are delivered, as well as
more dependent upon the relative
timing between primes and targets
(rather than on the timing between
the primes themselves) [7].
In our opinion, the jury is still out on
the question of the nature of the
information being combined when a
subliminal auditory digit is presented
together with a subliminal visual digit
within a priming paradigm. We believe
that this question can be resolved by
exploiting several of the classic
features of multisensory integration.
Regardless of the resolution of that
question, however, the study by Faivre
et al. [3] stands as a provocative
contribution to the question of binding
and consciousness by definitively
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R159showing that the property of
congruence between auditory and
visual information can be established
outside of awareness.References
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Body–World InterfaceA new study reveals the action of a rapid process by which our perceptual
systems adapt to improve the localization of touches when our limbs are in
novel postures.Andrew J. Bremner*
and Jose´ van Velzen
As we move through and explore our
worlds, our bodies and limbs come into
momentary contact with a complex and
ever-changing array of objects and
surfaces. Somehow the brain has to
assemble these, often fleeting, tactile
sensations into representations of the
world and the bodily self [1,2]. Perhaps
one of the greatest challenges to this
achievement is movement: every time
our limbs change posture, the relation
between tactile coordinates on the skin
surface and locations in the external
environment changes. To take a
relatively straightforward example, if
you cross your arms a tactile stimulus
on your left hand will, rather than
occurring as usual on the left side of
your body, now occur on the right
(Figure 1). In maintaining a coherent
representation of the world and the
body, how does the brain respond to
the numerous transient postures of the
body and limbs which occur from
moment to moment across our daily
routines?
A number of studies in recent years
have shown that when locating a
touch we rapidly take the current
position of the limbs into account to
remap it to its location in the external
world (for example, [3–5]). This
process is not perfect, however:
we tend to make more mistakes
locating touches when our arms arein unusual postures [6–9]. Similarly,
we tried typing this dispatch with
crossed hands, but quickly gave up.
There is a reason why we don’t
usually do things with crossed
hands: our sensorimotor systems are
set up in some way to expect our
bodies to have a canonical alignment
(Figure 1) [10]. In a new study
reported in this issue of Current
Biology, Azan˜o´n et al. [11] show
that the brain takes this problem
seriously. They find that when a new
atypical limb posture is adopted — in
this case, the crossed-hands
posture — tactile localisation
improves rapidly, so that reliable
performance benefits are seen even
across sequential trials.
Ways of Adapting to New Limb
Postures in Adults and Across
Development
We certainly need adaptive processes
like that demonstred by Azan˜o´n et al.
[11]. Given the variety of postures
through which our bodies and
limbs move from moment to
moment, our ability to make sense
of the tactile stream of information
presented to the nervous system
seems almost miraculous. But spare
a thought also for the poor
developing infant and child: not only
do infants have to cope with the wide
range of postures which their bodies
can adopt (and which increase
dramatically in early life), but thecanonical layout of their limbs is also
changing — infants can gain as much
as 2.5 cm in height within just two
days [12].
But what precisely is it that our
brains do to improve our performance
in new or atypical body layouts?
One possibility is that we rapidly
change assumptions about where
our limbs usually rest in space —
that is, that we update our
representations of canonical body
layout. Another is that we hone
our representations of where exactly
our hands are right now. Whilst one
might want to question whether there
is any reason to posit separate
contributions of current and prior
information to hand representation,
research from our lab [13–15] with
human infants suggests that there
might be justification for such a
distinction.
Six-month-old infants find it more
difficult to locate touch stimuli when
their hands are crossed [13], a finding
which points to the influence of a
representation of canonical body
posture even at this tender age.
But when investigating how the
six-month-old brain processes tactile
stimuli, we could find no evidence
that this age group integrated into
somatosensory processing the current
posture of the limbs, as do adults and
ten-month-old infants [4,5,14]. Thus, in
six-month-olds, the canonical layout of
the body influences responses to
tactile stimuli without any evident
ability to remap tactile location
according to the current position of
the arms [15].
Studies which have examined
the role of experience on tactile
localisation in unfamiliar postures,
prior to Azan˜o´n et al. [11], have
demonstrated relatively slow
